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Abstract 
Large network size has been seen as the main reason behind networks’ success in the 
past in terms of value creation and making different types of interactions possible. This 
paradigm has been challenged, however, by some of the recent studies as some sizeable 
networked platforms, e.g., MySpace and Orkut, have seen their end even after being the 
market leader in terms of the network size. 
This paper questions the network size as the sole determinant of networks’ success. It 
explores several important characteristics of a network in addition to its size, e.g., 
structure, roles, groups and conduct, which advance users’ possibilities for value 
capturing. The comprehensive literature review in studies on strategic management, 
management science, information systems science, sociology and economics done in this 
thesis proposes that considering aforementioned characteristics in platform design helps 
in laying a solid foundation for the healthy growth of networks. Supporting, e.g., 
interactivity, connectedness and the creation of ties helps users derive value from network 
more efficiently, making the network more attractive to new adopters, which in turn can 
result in a phenomenon called network effect. 
In addition, this paper gives practical suggestions on how network effects could be 
better sustained in multi-sided platforms. In conclusion, platform developers can keep 
the platform relevant in the long term by, for example, promoting openness and allowing 
third-party developers to contribute to the platform development, investing in and 
developing technologies that are relevant to the platform’s core function and subsidizing 
the weaker side of the platform in order to maintain a balanced user base. 
Keywords  platform design, network effects, social network theory, multi-sided 
platforms, network growth 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Groups and users in networked platforms, e.g., Facebook, Amazon and Couchsurfing, 
can be thought of as nodes where interactions can connect them to different parts of the 
whole network. Thus, the more possibilities there are to interact, the more the members 
can gain knowledge and be aware of what is happening in their community. As a result, 
they can take part in different activities provided by the whole ecosystem. The more 
relevant possibilities the network provides, the more value there is for a user to gain as 
it gets easier to explore other users and groups with similar interests and motivations. In 
order for us to develop practical and user-friendly networks and platforms, we need to 
take into consideration the fact that it is people who operate in them, which is why we 
are in need of a better understanding of how and why they take part in the selected 
networks and platforms in the first place. 
The way network success and network effects, i.e. demand- or supply-side economies of 
scale, are achieved has been seen mainly as a result of the network size by the more 
classical network theorists (Katz & Shapiro, 1985), who according to the more modern 
network theorists may have made some hasty generalizations when they have defined 
network value based mostly on the network size (Afuah, 2013; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 
2017), failing to take other important parameters into consideration. 
Many successful networked platforms have seen success after their initial focus on a 
niche group and have grown the network selectively afterwards; for example, Facebook 
first focused on expanding the service for university students in Ivy League universities 
and only then, after finding success in a small network, spread the service to other similar 
segments such as high school students. Instagram first provided a filter tool for 
photographs and after becoming successful within a small niche of users, extended the 
service to a community for all mobile photographers. Facebook is also a great example 
of keeping its platform open for innovation and developers, which is said to be one of its 
keys to success (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017). This has helped them focus their resources 
on the development of their core services. On the contrary, remaining too closed and not 
allowing interested and relevant stakeholders to participate in the platform development 
was the demise of the social networking site MySpace (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017). 
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1.1 Research objectives and questions 
 
It seems to be of a great importance to form a proper understanding on how networks 
function at large and how people can derive value from them. Supporting network 
characteristics that help users derive value—i.e., structure, groups, user roles and 
conduct—and establishing a valuable ecosystem around a network can help it sustain 
itself better and to stay relevant to the user in the long run. 
Therefore, in this thesis, my goal is to answer the following questions: 
1. Which network characteristics are relevant in allowing and helping the 
network user in deriving value from a network? 
I decided to choose the first question since a large number of networked platforms, e.g., 
MySpace and Orkut, have seen their end even after being the leader in terms of the 
network size. Some of the recent studies (Afuah, 2013; Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015; 
McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017) have expressed how a number of possibly important 
parameters are being left in the shadow as the size has become the most celebrated 
characteristic.  
2. How can platform developers utilize this knowledge in creating network 
effects that are more sustainable? 
The second question is essential when thinking of networks from a more strategic point-
of-view; how can the network theory and the knowledge about characteristics be better 
utilized in establishing and developing networked platforms that have the ability to stay 
relevant for their users in the long term? 
 
1.2 Methods and scope of research 
 
I have used literature review as the main method in this thesis, utilizing some of the most 
comprehensive literature databases such as Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar. 
The studies that I have cited for this thesis are from several fields of study; strategic 
management, information systems science, management science, social science and 
economics. 
It was not easy to narrow down the subject of this thesis as there lies a lot of studies from 
the more mathematical side of networks as well as from information technology. I will 
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not focus on the mathematical side of networks in this thesis since recent studies 
(McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017) have called for the study of more qualitative attributes of 
networks in the creation of sustained, long-term network effects in platforms. 
After familiarizing myself with some studies (Afuah, 2013; Burt, 2004; Burt, 2000; 
Granovetter, 1973; Hariharan et al., 2016; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017), I decided to 
focus the approach of the thesis more on the intersection of strategic management, 
economics and social sciences as the studies I left out have not yet found a comprehensive 
answer to why certain networks and platforms last and find success from the more 
human perspective. 
 
1.3 Structure of research 
 
 
This thesis begins with a literature review covering the network theory from the 
aforementioned perspective (Chapter 2) after which network effects and their emergence 
will be discussed (Chapter 3). Chapter 2 goes through various characteristics which the 
studies have found the most important in defining network success, namely structure, 
conduct, groups and user roles. In Chapter 3, I will explore how network effects occur, 
what are the different approaches to achieve them and how the network  
theory discussed in Chapter 2 can be utilized in creating more sustainable network effects. 
After finishing each Chapter, I will make a concluding hypothesis based on the reviewed 
literature.  
 
2 OPTIMIZING NETWORKS 
 
2.1 Ways network structure affects value capturing 
 
The amount of different network structures is not limited to a certain number—there 
exists, for example, different variations of one-, two- and multi-sided networks, networks 
where a high level of isolation or density is present. More importantly, network structure 
is rather an emerging trait of a network (Kogut, 2000), which, however, doesn’t mean 
that it couldn’t be actively contributed to by developers. Afuah (2013) defines network’s 
structure as “the number of members, the relationships among them, and the 
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heterogeneity and relative characteristics of members and their relationships”. The most 
commonly built structures of networks in different platforms can be seen in Figure 1; 
Figure 1a represents a network where everyone can interact with each other (e.g., the 
national telephone network), Figure 1b illustrates a two-sided network where members 
of side 1 can only transact with members from side 2 and vice versa (e.g., a credit card 
service), Figure 1c shows three subnetworks inside a larger network where nodes can be 
isolated from each other and the interaction in-between can be restricted (e.g., Facebook 
groups), and in Figure 1d subnetworks are feebly connected through a link (e.g., different 
parts of one’s LinkedIn network). 
Network structure affects network value in numerous ways (Afuah, 2013; Economides, 
1996; Lee et al., 2006; Shriver et al., 2013). First, it affects how easily different 
interactions happen and transactions can be made between the users. When designing a 
network, the priority should be on creating a structure that provides every user with the 
possibility to interact with each other in order to maximize the connections inside the 
network and thus its value to the user (Afuah, 2013) (See Figures 1 and 2). In a telephone 
network, for example, allowing the interaction between all of its users in an unrestricted 
way maximizes the number of possible phone calls made, which also makes it more 
attractive for new people to start using a phone. However, not all of the networks are 
optimal for the aforementioned style of interaction; on various social networking sites, 
e.g. Facebook or LinkedIn, groups’ admins can set restrictions on who can join their 
group and conversation. Thus, maximizing the amount of interactions is not the always 
the ultimate goal in a network, as the users of different platforms may benefit from 
certain restrictory features, such as those of Facebook and LinkedIn, that add to the 
functionality of the network. In addition, in credit card networks cardholders are not 
meant to interact with each other and as are not merchants with each other either (see 
Figure 1b, where merchants are on Side 1 and cardholders on Side 2). Consequently, in 
such two-sided networks, having more members on Side 1 provides more value to 
members on Side 2 and vice versa (Afuah, 2013). Such transaction feasibility is greatly 
affected by the network structure, as we can see in Figure 1, which developers can have 
influence over.  
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Figure 1. Structure affects users’ possibilities to capture value (Afuah, 2013). 
 
Second, the network structure affects how the members can position themselves inside 
the network and thus how they can capture or add value; the more central one’s position, 
the more they can provide and receive value (Afuah, 2013; Sparrowe et al., 2001) (see 
Figure 1d; L and N are in a more central position compared to other members), yet some 
members may be able to reap the benefits off a more non-central position too. A high 
degree of centrality can allow certain members to act as entrepreneurs of the network, 
connecting people, items and knowledge (Burt, 2000; Gilsing & Duysters, 2008). This 
members’ possibility to capitalize on centrality and take part in entrepreneur-like 
activities inside the network is not a zero-sum game however; it brings also non-central 
members value as they will have a person bridging the network’s gaps, i.e., structural 
holes (see Figure 2b). The entrepreneurial member verifiably brings more diverse 
information together and thus generates the best ideas and allows non-central members 
to benefit from this knowledge as well (Burt, 2004; Gilsing & Duysters, 2008). 
Third, the way ties are built between individual users and groups inside the network has 
a great effect on how much they can derive value from the network and therefore also 
how willing they are to use it or belong to it over a long period of time (Afuah, 2013; 
Suarez, 2005). Granovetter (1973), a pioneer in social networks, describes the strength 
of a tie as a result of “the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual 
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie”, after which he 
suggests that strong ties are not what make a network sustain; it is actually the amount 
of weak ties, i.e., infrequent and distant relations (Afuah, 2013), that allows for the 
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individual to explore and grasp new opportunities and integrates them into communities. 
Strong ties, i.e. continual and intimate relations (Afuah, 2013), are best for building local 
cohesion and helping the users to explore and adapt to new products and technologies 
(Suarez, 2005). However, they are not of great help in keeping distant individuals or 
communities together (Granovetter, 1973; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). On the contrary, 
weak links do not help create meaning to network members on the daily basis same way 
as strong links do, as strong links, i.e., close friends and family, generate trust and reduce 
individual’s chance of  misbehaving, but rather in the long term as weak links can bring 
value to the users in other ways, e.g., by acting as a bridge between distant individuals 
and communities (Hansen, 1999), and bringing, e.g., unseen job opportunities and 
information to them this way. As both of the ties have an essential role in allowing the 
users to derive value from their networks, they should be greatly emphasized in platform 
development; supporting members in building strong ties helps them accumulate 
knowledge and locate their needs and supporting them in building weak ties helps them 
receive and spread knowledge from and to a larger audience and better achieve their 
needs (Afuah, 2013; Jack, 2005). 
In addition, Hansen (1999) demonstrates how the flow of information between network’s 
members can be increased by promoting information codification between ties (see 
Table 1). Molding information into a certain format and removing unnecessary 
restrictive functions promotes information accessibility and connectivity inside of a 
network (Hansen, 1999). This can allow network members to build larger and more 
useful personal networks. We can see in Table 1 below, that high search benefits and low 
amount of problems in knowledge retrieval and exploration are related to having 
information in a codified and independent format. Codifying knowledge is a practice of 
having knowledge uploaded on a specified page in a specified form (Hansen, 1999). In 
addition, independent knowledge is independent from its creator and understandable 
without instructions (Hansen, 1999). In order to utilize this in practice, users can be 
instructed to write down their accumulated knowledge for others to explore—some 
examples include public reviews, transaction history, hashtags et cetera. Having features 
like this makes it more valuable for users to also have weak ties, as new information 
becomes easier to explore through them. Structural elements also allow for value to be 
derived from a network and for network effects to occur, which is a phenomenon I will 
address thoroughly later in this paper. 
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 THE TIE STRENGTH 
KNOWLEDGE Strong Weak 
Non-codified, 
Dependent 
Search benefits: Low 
Transfer problems: Moderate 
Search benefits: High 
Transfer problems: High 
Codified, 
Independent 
Search benefits: Low 
Transfer problems: Low 
Search benefits: High 
Transfer problems: Low 
 
Table 1. Search and transfer effects associated with four combinations of knowledge complexity and tie 
strength (Hansen, 1999). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Network structure affects how interactions and transactions 
can be made between users, how users can derive value by positioning 
themselves in a desired way and how ties are built between users. These 
components altogether allow for value to be derived better from a network 
by its users. 
 
2.2 User benefits of having different roles 
 
Kumar et al. (2006) distinguish three different member groups in networks; singletons, 
giant components and the middle region. Singletons, who could also be called loners, are 
users who have recently joined the network but haven’t made a single connection yet 
with another user. Singletons derive value inside the network from other features of the 
platform than its users. Giant components form the network’s largest group of people 
who are interconnected with the majority of other users. They could be described as the 
node L in Figure 1d or any node in Figure 1a. Middle region is considered something 
between the singletons and giant components; it consists of the communities or small 
groups inside the network who actively interact with each other but not with the network 
as a whole. Different kinds of nodes that resemble middle region can be recognized in 
Figure 1c. In social networking sites, these groups of middle region often possess a 
collective enthusiasm towards a more niche interest, e.g., paragliding, activism or electric 
cars. Generally speaking, allowing people to gather up and boundlessly discover interests 
either familiar or new to them results in greater user satisfaction and commitment 
(Katona et al., 2011). However, there may arise a need for a person to moderate and guide 
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the interactions based on the purpose of the network and its users’ needs1 (Mislove et al., 
2007). 
 Members who play a critical role inside these aforementioned groups include initiators 
and brokers. Brokers can be divided into non-brokers, external brokers and internal 
brokers (Zhang et al., 2016). Brokers are entrepreneurial members of the network who 
possess a competitive advantage over other members in terms of knowledge and contact 
ownership, which helps them bring more value to themselves through greater amount of 
contacts and trust (Burt, 2000). Initiators can act as either non-brokers or external or 
internal brokers, depending on their position and connectivity with other parts of the 
network (Zhang et al., 2016) The difference between internal and external brokers is that 
internal brokers intertwine groups of individuals together within a platform and external 
brokers connect initiators between many different platforms. Therefore, platform 
providers can promote connectivity when growing the platform by focusing on attracting 
non-opportunistic brokers to join the network (Afuah, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 2. Role of various actors in a social network (Zhang et al., 2016). 
 
These members can have a number of different roles based on the network’s structure 
and conduct (Afuah, 2013). The amount of roles a user has or can have is one of the key 
determinants in defining the value users can derive from the network. On Airbnb2, for 
                                                        
1 In, e.g., the mobile messaging platform Jodel (https://jodel-app.com/) based on a local community and 
anonymity, users who have received certain amount of positive feedback on their posts can choose to 
moderate posts and discussions. 
2 https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us  
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example, members can act as both tenants and hosts. They also have a responsible role 
of supervising by providing reviews of tenants and hosts. Same applies to, e.g. the 
transportation service Uber3, where both sides of the network can have roles not limited 
only to the core activity, i.e. ordering or driving a car, but are also encouraged to, e.g., 
giving feedback to the customer and messaging with each other. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The larger the number of relevant roles available to or owned 
by a user, the larger the amount of value to be derived. In addition, having 
a role more central can bring more value to the user. 
 
2.3 Supporting interactivity through conduct 
 
Network conduct, i.e., how and what kind of interactions can occur plays a significant 
role in network’s sustainability according to several studies (Afuah, 2013; Chen et al., 
2009; Mislove et al., 2007). Afuah (2013) recognizes three separate subcategories of 
network conduct; opportunistic behavior, reputation effects and trust. Firstly, 
opportunistic behavior, e.g., black markets or unfair information brokerage, can occur 
when network members have an option to abuse their position to gain unfair advantage 
compared to other members (Afuah, 2013; Burt, 2000; Viswanath et al., 2014). Thus, 
maximizing the utility to the members equally calls for the platform to be designed in a 
way that decreases such behavior, and one way to achieve such result is to enable other 
members to gain more collectively from such behavior than the opportunists themselves 
(Burt, 2000). In practice, this has been achieved by, for example, rewarding users for 
recognizing and reporting such activity. However, opportunistic behavior can produce 
benefits in some rare cases, e.g., in some digital products4 (Conner & Rumelt, 1991), 
where piracy has helped create several phenomena among, e.g., game or music hobbyists, 
but this is apparently an exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, opportunistic 
possibilities can act as a source of attraction to their seekers, e.g., entrepreneurs, inside 
social networks, which as mentioned, can sometimes benefit the network as a whole 
when regulated in a proper manner. 
                                                        
3 https://www.uber.com/en-FI/  
4 For example, CDs, music albums and games. 
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Secondly, allowing for reputation effects to occur in networks can greatly help its 
members to upkeep an appropriate behavior and act in line with the network conduct 
(Afuah, 2013). Examples of reputation effects that have worked in creating 
aforementioned behavior on, for example, the marketplace and trade platform eBay 
include user reviews, rating system, messaging, transaction records and account 
personalization (Li, 2010). Users also love to contribute to the reputation effects inside 
the network by giving feedback to the users of the opposing side (Resnick et al., 2006); 
on eBay, for example, even though giving feedback after each transaction is voluntary, 
half of the buyers decide to provide the seller with it which indicates a high level of 
courtesy and respect for the conduct in the network. Thus, it can be considered as a great 
tool for the users to contribute to the collective healthiness of the network. 
Thirdly, trust between members and platform providers can be a deal-breaker for the 
members to use providers’ services (Chen et al., 2009). As the unrestrained flow of 
information and interactions add to the mutual trust and longevity inside of a network 
(Hansen, 1999; Shriver et al., 2013; Uzzi, 1997), it seems to be of great importance to the 
network provider to help its users to interact with each other in order for them to build 
meaningful connections and thus make the network last longer.  
According to Chen et al. (2009) trust can be either mutual—between users, or one-way—
towards the platform provider, in a network, of which the significance of mutual trust in 
building loyalty towards the platform provider has been undervalued for a long time, the 
research suggests. A good example of finding success through building mutual trust in 
platforms can be found in the Chinese e-commerce market which eBay entered in 2003 
by acquiring Eachnet.com 5 . Eachnet.com emphasized transactions over social 
interactions between its users—the platform prohibited the use of instant messaging, 
which turned out to be a huge anticlimax for its users and in reference to an interviewee’s 
comment on why users were disappointed with Eachnet.com’s service: “sometimes 
people want to buy because of impulse” (Ou & Davison, 2009). The lack of this simple 
feature made it more difficult for the users to locate sellers who were available. This made 
the buying process inconvenient and ultimately had many of the users switch to the 
competing Chinese C2C platform, Taobao.com, launched in 2003. As a result of this 
minor flaw in the platform’s design, eBay (China)’s community service was ranked 
among one of the most unsatisfactory services offered by eBay (China) (Ou & Davison, 
2009).   
                                                        
5 Eachnet.com is an online customer-to-customer platform in China, started in 1999. 
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Trust is something that makes people believe their exchange partner will not act in an 
opportunistic way when interacting, not even to achieve minuscule short-term benefits 
or advantage (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Researchers have distinguished four main 
types of trust in social networks; deterrence-based, calculus-based, institution-based and 
relational trust (see Table 2) (Rousseau et al., 1998).  
Deterrence-based trust is based on the utilitarian idea that people who misbehave or 
exploit the system or each other will receive sanctions greater than the possible gains 
derived and thus it is worthwhile to consider other parties and the system as a whole 
trustworthy. Some examples of sustaining deterrence-based trust include banning users 
from the service and blocking parties from seeing each other after inappropriate behavior.  
Calculus-based trust is built upon the notion that trust comes from rational acts and 
choices; interactions in general happen due to users’ positive intentions and economic 
transactions benefiting each party involved, which is why it would be counter-intuitive 
for the party to take part in exploitative behavior. In online auctions, for example, each 
party has the incentive to act in accordance to the conduct in the long run in order to 
keep finding and executing the most profitable auctions available. 
Institution-based trust can help calculus-based and relational trust form (Rousseau et 
al., 1998). When there are credible institutions involved in the network, it can help its 
members build the initial trust needed for them to start building connections and take 
part in interactions between each other. In online marketplaces, for example, having a 
trusted agency ensuring consumer protection can help improve the initial trust a good 
deal.  
Lastly, relational trust is a form of trust that is built over time; as network members 
continuously perform beneficial transactions, the trust between them will grow. Ou et al. 
(2009) demonstrate this in Table 3 below, where the trust and transaction frequency 
increase simultaneously. In the beginning, the user who is looking to make a transaction 
feels indifferent about the seller, if they haven’t operated together yet. However, as the 
amount of successful bilateral transactions increases, so does the satisfaction between 
both parties.  
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Table 2. Different forms of trust, compiled and adapted from Rousseau et al., (1998). 
  
 
Arbitrary 
Scale Value 
Verbal 
Description 
of Value 
Description of the 
Awareness 
Driven Trust 
and Action 
Seller 
Insistence 
+4 
This is the only seller I would 
consider buying from. 
Long-term trust is stable. 
Customer loyalty has developed 
through repeated communication 
with the seller in the IM. 
Seller 
Preference 
+3 
This is one of my preferred 
sellers. 
Long-term trust is developed. List 
the seller in the IM as a friend to 
keep in touch with. 
Seller 
Acceptance 
+2 
This is not one of my preferred 
sellers, but it would be 
acceptable if my preferred 
sellers are not available. 
The initial trust is built. List the 
seller in the IM as a friend. 
Seller 
Awareness 
+1 
I have noticed this seller 
online, but I have no 
information about him or her. 
The swift trust is created. This seller 
is in the interested group and to be 
added in the IM list. 
Seller 
Ignorance 
0 
The seller is not online and 
thus ignored. I know nothing 
about this seller. 
No trust intention. No further 
contact interest. 
Seller 
Rejection 
-4 
I would never willingly buy 
from this seller. 
Distrust exists. Blacklist this seller in 
the IM. 
 
Table 3. Seller Awareness-Attitude Structure (Ou & Davison, 2009). 
 TYPE OF TRUST 
 Deterrence-
based 
Calculus 
-based 
Institution-
based 
Relational 
Basis Emphasis on 
utilitarianism. 
Emphasis on 
rational choice. 
Emphasis on 
institutional 
support. 
Emphasis on 
trust emerging 
over time. 
Definition 
Parties consider 
each other 
trustworthy 
because of the 
existing sanctions 
which reduce the 
chance of 
exploitation. 
Parties consider 
each other 
trustworthy 
because of their 
credibility and 
observable 
positive 
intentions. 
Institutions present 
can increase the 
initial trust, 
promoting risk 
taking and trustful 
behavior in the 
future. 
Parties consider 
each other 
trustworthy 
because of 
repeated 
successful 
transactions. 
Practical 
Application(s) 
Develop deterrents 
efficient enough to 
reduce 
misbehavior, but 
also light enough 
not to scare 
potential new users 
away. 
Promote 
transparency and 
reduce the 
possibilities of 
hiding or faking 
relevant 
information 
related to 
transactions. 
Have a credible 
institution involved 
when the initial 
trust needs to be 
built, and possibly 
on the long run as 
well to sustain 
trust. 
Let users interact 
freely with a 
preferred partner 
to generate trust 
before suggesting 
other 
alternatives. 
  
13 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Large amount of opportunistic behavior lowers the value of 
network to its users. A high level of trust promotes the amount of 
transactions and thus longevity of network. Reputation effects increase 
users’ dependability, trustworthiness and honesty and thus also the 
possibility for users to derive value. 
 
3 ACHIEVING NETWORK EFFECTS 
 
3.1 What are network effects and how do they occur? 
 
Network effects6, also known as demand-side economies of scale, can be seen everywhere 
around us; we go to the library with the largest offering, we only use the QWERTY 
keyboard, we go to the mall with the most stores and we are tempted to buy the same 
software package or application everyone else is using. There is something these 
aforementioned cases have in common; the operator that has the most users or the 
largest offering usually wins. Network effects occur in these kinds of situations where a 
product or a service becomes more valuable to us as the density or the amount of users 
increases (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005). Consider a comparison between Facebook and 
Google+, for example; the user is more likely able to derive more value from Facebook 
than Google+, as there are more people using the service, the platform has a higher level 
of general functionality and it also provides other social networking sites (SNSs) with a 
greater compatibility with its services.  
In Table 4 below, Hariharan et al. (2016) show three different types of networks that 
have a different equation for value formation, which helps us understand why the 
amount of users is a significant trait in terms of achieving network effects; in broadcast 
networks, such as television or radio, the value increases linearly with the number of 
users. In peer to peer networks, e.g., Facebook or Skype, the amount of value increases 
in proportion to the square as new members join and one- or two-way connections—
following or friending, are formed. In group forming networks, e.g., WhatsApp or Slack, 
the network value can increase exponentially with the size of the network. 
                                                        
6 Network effects are sometimes referred to as network externalities. 
  
14 
 
Table 4. Three common laws for assessing the value of communication networks (Hariharan et al., 2016). 
 
In Figure 4 below, I visualize how the network size results in network value growth in 
different types of networks, where group forming networks seem to have an exponential 
value growth potential, higher than that of peer to peer and broadcast networks. 
 
  
Figure 4. A simplistic visualization of differences in value generation between different network types as 
defined in Table 4. 
 
Generally speaking, two separate subcategories of network effects can be recognized; 
direct and indirect. Direct, or the same side, network effects can occur due to the amount 
of the users using the network, providing users with broader means for communication 
and interaction among each other inside the network (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015; 
McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). Direct network effects are a type of phenomenon that is 
created by the demand side of the network (Lin & Lu, 2011), i.e., the users. Externalities 
of the same side can be seen when, for example, a large group of acquaintances or experts 
 
Sarnoff’s law Metcalfe’s law Reed’s law 
Value 
definition 
Value of a network is 
proportional to the 
number of viewers 
Value of a network is 
proportional to square of 
number of connected 
users 
Value of group-forming network 
is proportional to number and 
ease with which groups form 
within it 
Network 
value 𝑉 ∝ 𝑛 𝑉 ∝ 𝑛
2 𝑉 ∝ 2𝑛 
Network 
type 
Broadcast (Yahoo) Peer to Peer (Facebook) 
Group Forming (WhatsApp or 
Slack) 
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are using similar software or hardware products; with a large community of users it 
becomes handier to receive support from peers and exchange knowledge regarding the 
products and thus the prolonged use of them becomes more convenient (Lee et al., 2006).  
Indirect, or cross-platform, network effects take place as a result of the complementarity 
provided by the supply side of the network (Lin & Lu, 2011). In, e.g., the computer 
hardware market, it usually makes the most sense for the consumer to acquire such 
computer that has the best compatibility with and access to relevant software programs. 
Software products can produce similar effects, too. Consider Steam7, for example; having 
the largest online offering in games and gaming-related activities, people are attracted 
to start using the platform as a comprehensive tool for gaming and gaming-related 
activities as they will have everything centered in one single platform. Simultaneously, 
both the platform and the gamers benefit from the rising amount of game developers 
joining the platform and their game uploads and the game developers can enjoy the large 
customer base and the high level of concentration of customers Steam is providing them 
with. The platform also provides great compatibility with other social platforms which 
results in a remarkable amount of synergy.  
 
3.2 Network effects in multi-sided platforms 
 
I previously discussed what networks and network effects are and how they can be 
defined. Here I will try to answer the more practical question of network effects; how can 
they be actually achieved and sustained? 
Multi-sided platforms (MSPs) bring two or more sides together who then interact with 
each other via the platform (Hagiu & Wright, 2015). Some examples of MSPs include a 
retailer Amazon, who enables third-party sellers to do transactions directly with the 
customers through its platform; Zappos, whose core is shoe retailing, abandoned its 
initial business model based on providing a marketplace for a selected group of shoe 
brands and instead started acting as a platform for shoe retailers and traders in general; 
and a hospitability platform Couchsurfing, who focuses on bringing travelers together 
with local hosts and communities. MSPs differ from more traditional, two-sided 
platforms, in a way that interaction is not limited just to between two parties—usually 
                                                        
7 Steam (http://store.steampowered.com/) is a digital distribution platform for games, video streaming 
and social networking services for computer gamers, having 15 million concurrent users in September 
2017. 
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parties can define their own role and fulfill as many different roles simultaneously on the 
platform as desired (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2008; Hagiu, 2014); acting as, for example, a 
seller, a buyer, a moderator, a spectator or all of them at the same time. Hagiu (2014) 
recognizes two defining characteristics of an MSP that make it different from product 
platforms and resellers; first, each of the sides are customers of the MSP in a relevant 
way to them and second, the MSP enables the interaction directly between sides, making 
the middleman unnecessary. 
Since network effects occur mainly due to the extra value the network provides its users 
with (Amit & Zott, 2001), achieving both direct, i.e. same side, and indirect, i.e. cross-
platform, network effects in platforms can take place after the network can provide its 
users with a significant amount of value.  
 
3.2.1 Direct network effects in multi-sided platforms 
 
Platforms can produce direct network effects by increasing their user base. According to 
the network closure theory (Burt, 2005), a potential user is more likely to join a new 
network if the users who are inviting the new user to join, are already related to each 
other (Katona et al., 2011). Thus, opting for a high clustering coefficient8  in groups 
increases the probability of new users joining and committing to the network in the long 
term. Consequently, MSPs should initially focus on creating a user base where it is 
natural for its users to have some kind of a connection between each other. For example, 
Facebook succeeded in doing this when they grew the network by bringing together 
people who, by a high probability, knew each other from before, which made it easier for 
them to invite new people to join the network with a higher probability of success. 
Considering this sensibility of adopting a new technology or a network is crucial in the 
early phases of the network growth, since the network will begin to grow itself organically 
after reaching the critical mass9 (Shapiro & Varian, 1998)—a network constructed in a 
way that supports this notion will be more easily grown and administered in the future.  
                                                        
8 Clustering coefficient is calculated by dividing the number of links among the neighbors by the maximum 
number of possible relationships between them (Albert & Barabási, 2002). Thus, the higher the coefficient, 
the higher the level of connectedness between a selected group of users. 
9 Critical mass is the size of a user base after which it will become self-sustained and produce further 
growth by itself. 
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In Figures 5 and 6 below Kumar et al. (2006) show how the network density, i.e., the 
ratio of undirected edges to nodes, of Flickr and Yahoo! 360 developed. In both graphs, 
during the first stage, the density grows rapidly during the first weeks and reaches its 
initial peak around the week 10, followed by the second stage, where a lengthy dip occurs 
after which the density finds a gradual increase by organic growth in the third stage.  
 
Figure 5. Density of Flickr network, by week (Kumar et al., 2006).  
 
 
Figure 6. Density of Yahoo! 360 network, by week (Kumar et al., 2006). 
 
 
There is a lot of enthusiasm among the early users of networks which could be utilized 
by the developers of MSPs. Usually the relative growth peaks right after the launch of the 
network, as the initial users are excited about exploring something new and are eager to 
invite their friends to join the network as well (Kumar et al., 2006). 
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In the first stage, we can assume that in the cases of both Flickr and Yahoo! 360, it was a 
small, dense group that started the phenomenon and began to spread the message to 
other potential users. As time passed, new, disconnected groups emerged. As a result, 
the network got less dense as a whole as time passed. During the second stage, the 
network consists mainly of groups that can be assimilated to the middle region—groups, 
which have a solid form, but are not yet interacting with other parts of the whole network. 
As a result of the growing density in the third stage, giant components, as described in 
Chapter 2.2, formed. After reaching this stage, the different parts of network become 
highly interconnected and organic growth is to be expected without too much extra effort 
(Shapiro & Varian, 1998). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Focusing on attracting groups of users with a high clustering 
coefficient will make it easier to attract even more users to the platform in 
the future, resulting in direct network effects. 
 
3.2.2 Indirect network effects in multi-sided platforms 
 
Allowing for indirect, i.e., cross-platform, network effects to occur in MSPs is essential 
for their sustainability. As described earlier in Chapter 3.1, indirect network effects occur 
as a result of the rising of complementary products (Lin & Lu, 2011). For example, it is 
highly beneficial to people to choose Windows operating system, since there lies a great 
amount of popular products and services that it supports, e.g., spreadsheet software, 
movie-editing software, games et cetera. Consequently, in order for platform owners to 
support the occurrence of indirect network effects in their platforms, they should focus 
on allowing the open development of these products and service. 
Apple, one of the world’s largest platform companies, was on the brink of going bankrupt, 
when its technology remained closed for too long (West, 2003). Same happened to 
MySpace more recently, which ended up losing its focus by developing everything for 
everyone by themselves (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017). Thus, having a platform open 
enough will help the platform to be contributed to by third-party developers and thus the 
platform will keep up better with the pace of users’ rising demands (Parker & Van Alstyne, 
2017). Making the technology open to third-party developers has, obviously, both pros 
and cons; it can help build momentum behind the platform with increasing speed in 
development, but it can also risk its creator’s ability to control the platform (Boudreau, 
2010).  
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Another way to increase the occurrence of indirect network effects is to advance 
compatibility between platforms (Matutes & Regibeau, 1992), as the high level of 
compatibility results in overall efficiency, making it easier for users to adopt new services 
(Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). A platform that is highly compatible with other platforms 
is more likely to provide its users with larger amount of value than those that are not 
(McIntyre & Subramaniam, 2009). It should be noted, however, that platforms with a 
large installed base tend to resist compatibility with small rivals (Farrell & Klemperer, 
2007). Thus, the decision to collaborate with a selected platform should be thoroughly 
evaluated. 
In some cases, users may ponder whether a single platform provides them everything 
they need related to a selected area of interest. They have to decide whether they want to 
use a single platform or multiple platforms for their needs related to, e.g., social 
interaction; some get their needs fulfilled by using just Facebook, while others need to 
use Instagram, Twitter and LinkedIn as well. This is called single- or multi-homing 
(Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Farrell & Klemperer, 2007); an observation 
on how many platforms the user is using to derive the needed value. Single-homing 
occurs in, e.g., credit card platforms, when the user has the membership of only one 
service provider (Rochet & Tirole, 2004). On the other hand, multi-homing occurs when, 
in the aforementioned situation, the user has the membership of multiple service 
providers. When trying to achieve indirect network effects, it is important to recognize 
how and what kind of value the network in hand is providing its users with and if it was 
be possible to have the features they need assembled in one platform to ease the process 
of value capturing. Establishing possibilities for different networks to be integrated with 
each other better among the same area of interest allows for win-win-situations to occur 
for the platforms involved, where the longevity of all of them becomes an interest to the 
user as well.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Platform openness can help build momentum for the 
platform, attracting even more third-party developers to create 
complementary products and resulting in indirect network effects. 
 
3.3 Sustaining the growth 
 
Network effects tend to occur when the platform has gained an advantage in terms of the 
size of its user base and when the network characteristics favor constant value capturing. 
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But how can this effect be sustained in the long term? Generally, the literature on 
networks and networked industries has found three main elements that are relevant to 
the management of value capturing in networks and which advance the occurrence and 
sustainability of network effects: users’ expectations, users’ coordination and 
compatibility with other networks (Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Katz & Shapiro, 1994). In the 
context of MSPs, this means that investing continuously in these three elements, keeps 
the platform relevant to the user and allows the continuous value capturing. 
Users tend to favor products and services offered by an operator with a larger installed 
base (Birke & Swann, 2006). Thus, when choosing a platform, users expect that it will be 
or become the dominant actor in the industry (Eisenmann, 2006). As a result, network 
owners are incentivized to communicate a message to the current and potential users 
that it will be the best option to them in the future as well. Platform developers can show 
long-term commitment to the platform development in order to meet or exceed users’ 
expectations (Hariharan et al., 2016). By investing in and developing technologies that 
are relevant to the platform and its core function, the platform provider can send a signal 
to its users that it will remain more relevant to them than other MSPs in the future. 
Increasing the network size may not always be the answer to satisfy user needs per se, as 
in social networks users are not usually as interested in the aggregate network as they 
are in their relevant network (Boudreau & Hagiu, 2008). Thus, developing mechanisms 
that create a better environment for users to sustain and develop ties meaningful to them 
will help the network remain relevant to them in the long run. 
In order to advance compatibility with other networks, developers of MSPs can try to 
make better use of the existing network and increase its relevance to other stakeholders 
as well, instead of hogging the network to themselves (Baldwin & Woodard, 2008; 
Hariharan et al., 2016; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). It comes as no surprise, why so many 
successful platforms have a high level of compatibility with other platforms. For example, 
Facebook helps the music streaming platform Spotify by providing them with a 
convenient identification and exploration of new music based on shared interests with 
their Facebook friends. This interconnectedness advances the ease and speed of use 
which is often the user’s expectation in today’s platforms. Facebook’s success has been 
said to be a result of the openness towards third-party developers and the way Facebook 
allows others to participate in the process of innovating and developing new features 
(Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017), while alternatively, the founder of MySpace stated, that 
the service’s demise was to remain too closed for too long and the way they tried to 
develop all of the features their users were requesting by themselves, made them 
ultimately lose their focus on the core of the service they were meant to develop in the 
first place (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017). 
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On the other hand, the platform owner must remain wary of giving too much power to 
complementors (Baldwin & Woodard, 2008). Allowing complementors to integrate their 
services on an unnecessarily high level might put the platform ownership at risk and lead 
to incremental dilution of the original platform owner’s relevance. For example, 
Microsoft has been successful in taking over some of the platform ownership from 
Android by making its products a standard in Android devices and services. By allowing 
this to happen, Android might have significantly reduced its relevance to the developer 
community as the major inclusion of Microsoft reduces their freedom to create services 
and products on Android. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Network effects can be sustained by communicating 
commitment to platform to stakeholders, opening the platform and its user 
base to third-party developers and subsidizing the different sides of the 
platform to keep the demand satisfied. 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I have studied how various network characteristics affect network users’ 
possibility to derive value from networks. In addition, I present how network effects 
occur and suggest how the phenomenon can be better sustained in multi-sided platforms. 
In the second chapter, I describe different important network characteristics based on 
the studied literature, namely structure, conduct, groups, roles and their role in allowing 
users’ value capturing. In the third chapter I describe the importance of these 
characteristics in the creation of sustainable network effects in multi-sided platforms by 
showing evidence from literature. 
The way various network characteristics allow network users’ value capturing can vary 
between networks, but the mentioned characteristics all still play a significant role in that. 
While the network size has for long been the most celebrated trait of a network, it does 
not seem to explain the network value and possibilities for value capturing alone. In 
general, network size does explain the value that the network can provide its users with, 
as presented in both Table 4 and Figure 4, but the claim that it would make a network 
successful alone, is too bold to be made. Developers of MSPs can increase the possibilities 
for value capturing by developing a suitable network structure that allows users to 
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position themselves in a desired way and form both strong and weak ties in order to 
derive the needed value.  
Even though growth is, understandably, a relevant strategic goal of many platforms, 
many important network characteristics can be and have been left in the shadow in the 
growth process. To support the sustained growth of a multi-sided platform, it is essential 
to consider other network characteristics that support the fulfilment of users’ needs well. 
In conclusion, I have listed the hypotheses made in this thesis in Tables 5 and 6 below. 
In addition, I have added suggestions how the studied characteristics could be taken into 
consideration in platform development and creation of sustainable network effects. 
 
 
NETWORK THEORY 
 
Network 
Characteristic 
Hypothesis 
 
Practical application(s) 
 
Structure 
H1: Network structure affects how 
interactions and transactions can be made 
between users, how users can derive value by 
positioning themselves in a desired way and 
how ties are built between users. These 
components altogether allow for value to be 
derived better from a network by its users. 
Build a structure that maximizes the 
amount of possible transactions 
between users. Allowing users to 
have a healthy ratio of both strong 
and weak ties helps users capture 
value and the network to be 
sustained. 
Roles and 
groups 
H2: The larger the number of relevant roles 
available to or owned by a user, the larger the 
amount of value to be derived. In addition, 
having a role more central can bring more 
value to the user. 
Do not limit the number of roles 
possessed by a user. When growing 
a network, focus on attracting non-
opportunistic users who have a 
tendency to play a central role. 
Conduct 
H3: Large amount of opportunistic behavior 
lowers the value of network to its users. A 
high level of trust promotes the amount of 
transactions and thus longevity of network. 
Reputation effects increase users’ 
dependability, trustworthiness and honesty 
and thus also the possibility for users to 
derive value. 
Minimize chances for opportunistic 
behavior in network. Create 
mechanisms that promote 
emergence of trust and build 
trustworthiness, honesty and 
dependability in network. 
 
Table 5. Hypotheses and practical applications of the thesis regarding the network theory. 
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NETWORK EFFECTS IN MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS 
 
Network 
effect type 
Hypothesis 
 
Practical application(s) 
 
Direct 
H4: Focusing on attracting groups of users 
with a high clustering coefficient will make it 
easier to attract even more users to the 
platform in the future, resulting in direct 
network effects. 
Start growing the user base by focusing 
on groups of people in narrow area who 
have the possibility of a having at least a 
feeble connection. 
Indirect 
H5: Platform openness can help build 
momentum for the platform, attracting even 
more third-party developers to create 
complementary products and resulting in 
indirect network effects. 
Support compatibility and advance 
openness in platform creation in to 
advance the ease of platform 
development and adoption. 
Sustained 
H6: Network effects can be sustained by 
communicating commitment to platform to 
stakeholders, opening the platform and its 
user base to third-party developers and 
subsidizing the different sides of the platform 
to keep the demand satisfied. 
Be proactive in creating possibilities for 
third parties to contribute to and utilize 
the platform, investing in technologies 
relevant in enabling value capturing and 
subsidizing the weaker sides of the 
platform. 
 
Table 6. Hypotheses and practical applications of the thesis regarding the creation of sustainable network 
effects in multi-sided platforms. 
 
5 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This thesis provides a general overview of the relevant network characteristics and their 
role in making value capturing possible for network users. Having a narrow scope in this 
thesis, however, leaves a lot of room for questions—e.g., how open should the platform 
remain for third-party contributors for the platform’s original creator to retain its 
ownership? How do platform developers recognize their core features, when outsourcing 
additional features to third-party contributors? How should the network characteristics 
be weighted and given importance to when designing networks in different platforms 
and what is their role in the occurrence of network effects? In general, more empirical 
research regarding the role of various network characteristics in supporting sustained 
growth of networks is still required to form a comprehensive and up-to-date 
understanding of how networks, and more precisely, multi-sided platforms succeed. 
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